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Emerging infections cause justiﬁ able global concern. 
Current outbreaks of avian inﬂ uenza A H7N91 and 
the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS)2 raise 
troubling memories of pandemic inﬂ uenza and 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). With few 
mutations,3–5 these or other pathogens could evolve to 
cause widespread outbreaks. 
When new threats emerge, well established public 
health systems rapidly identify cases and evaluate 
sources, clinicians provide early descriptive case 
reports, and laboratories develop diagnostics and 
characterise pathogens. Clinical science is markedly 
less agile. We lack the tools to answer key questions 
rapidly. Who is susceptible, and why? What are the 
mechanisms of disease? What are the sites and 
dynamics of pathogen replication? How can early cases 
be identiﬁ ed and stratiﬁ ed? What is the clinical utility 
of new diagnostics? What treatments might work?
Each emerging infection presents these fundamental 
questions. The method of answering them need 
not be reinvented from one infection to the next. If 
clinical scientists across the world were able to agree 
on methods and cooperate, the results of separate 
studies from diverse locations and conditions could 
be collated, allowing clinically useful conclusions to be 
reached from shared data.
The International Severe Acute Respiratory and 
Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC)6 grew from 
the recognition that we have to do things diﬀ erently, 
in the light of our experience during the epidemics of 
SARS, H5N1, and the 2009–10 inﬂ uenza pandemic, 
but also regional epidemics of enterovirus 71, 
dengue, viral haemorrhagic fevers, and even during 
the rapid emergence of drug resistant malaria.7 We 
must motivate and equip individual investigators and 
networks around the world to work together to rapidly 
answer basic questions when new threats emerge. 
Academic credit and access to data and samples must 
be given to clinical investigators, who often recruit 
patients in extremely challenging circumstances. 
Unlike the existing model that prioritises 
independence, eﬀ ective collaboration should be 
rewarded. The core materials needed to enrol patients 
must be freely available, making it as easy as possible 
for investigators at the front line.
The core materials of clinical research—protocols, 
information sheets, consent forms, and case 
report forms—are analogous to the source code 
of computer software. In open-source software 
projects contributors receive recognition that builds 
their reputation within the software community. 
We propose a similar approach to clinical research, 
in parallel with the drive towards open access 
in academic publishing.8 Although community 
projects have a long history in other ﬁ elds, individual 
recognition is required for scientists to obtain funding 
and promotion; to succeed, academic institutions, 
funders, journals, the clinical science and public health 
communities, and the public need to be in full support. 
To develop a consensus set of documentation, 
we engaged with investigators across countries 
and disciplines, in collaboration with WHO, in a 
systematic three-stage process: ﬁ rst, to agree criteria 
by which to prioritise and stratify studies; second, to 
identify important unanswered questions relating 
to pathogenesis, susceptibility, and pharmacology 
in severe infection; and to allocate studies within a 
globally scalable framework. 
In the resulting protocol, research intensity is 
stratiﬁ ed according to the local costs incurred. The 
lowest tiers have a minimum requirement for staﬀ  and 
resources to recruit a case (ﬁ gure), enabling adaptation 
for use in places with diﬀ ering resource levels, and also 
in diﬀ erent phases of an outbreak. For example, early 
in an outbreak there are urgent questions that require 
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TIER 2: Serial biological samples
•    Biological samples taken every 2 days during acute illness
•    Daily clinical data collection
TIER 1: Single biological sample
•    Single sample taken at recruitment (ideally at presentation to health care)
•    Initial case report form completed
•    Discharge case report form completed
TIER 3 (b)
•    Sampling of health-care 
       workers
TIER 3 (a)
•    Sampling of contacts of 
       confirmed cases
TIER 3 (c)
•    Population pharmacokinetics
      of antimicrobial/
      immunomodulatory 
      agents
Number of cases sought
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For the ISARIC protocol see 
http://www.prognosis.org/isaric
Figure: Stratiﬁ ed, modular framework of research studies enabling recruitment in a range of diﬀ erent conditions
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intensive study of a small number of cases; later, when 
larger numbers of cases present, it will be both more 
diﬃ  cult and less important to obtain frequent serial 
samples. 
ISARIC aims to reach a global consensus behind 
collection of harmonised clinical data linked with 
biological sampling protocols that are of value to 
anyone facing future outbreaks of any emerging 
infection. Importantly, our recommendations are 
not to be regarded as ﬁ xed and ﬁ nal, but an initial 
contribution to an evolving framework of research 
studies to which anyone, anywhere, may contribute 
and improve, and which will be openly shared in 
perpetuity. 
We regard this consensus as essential but not 
suﬃ  cient. Here we lay the foundations for more 
challenging coordinated studies, including clinical 
trials of pathogen-speciﬁ c therapies with pragmatic 
endpoints. We encourage clinicians everywhere to 
develop and share appropriate research protocols 
and seek approvals for clinical research that can begin 
immediately as soon as future epidemics threaten. 
Experience conﬁ rms that the time to act is now. 
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Vector control to eliminate artemisinin resistant malaria in 
the Greater Mekong subregion 
The emergence of artemisinin resistance in the 
Greater Mekong subregion threatens to undermine 
global progress in malaria control.1 Artemisinin 
derivatives are used in artemisinin-based combination 
therapy, the predominant ﬁ rst-line treatment for 
uncomplicated Plasmodium falciparum malaria. 
Eﬀ orts to contain artemisinin resistance were 
launched in 2009 and have since been expanded.2,3 
The required intervention scale-up is substantial 
and costly; most of the funds were not available by 
early 2013. To accelerate progress, the Global Fund 
announced in February, 2013, that it would contribute 
US$100 million to help support the emergency 
response to artemisinin resistance.4 Decisions on how 
best to allocate these resources are needed, including 
on how much to emphasise investments in vector 
control.5,6  
The main vectors for malaria transmission are in the 
Anopheles dirus and Anopheles minimus complexes, 
occurring predominantly in forested areas. A third 
vector, Anopheles epiroticus (formerly known as 
Anopheles sundaicus), occurs mainly in coastal areas. 
These vectors exhibit substantial outdoor resting 
and feeding,5,7 which could lead to the assumption 
that interventions used predominantly indoors, such 
as longlasting insecticidal nets and indoor residual 
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